





















This paper tests the uncovered interest parity (UIP) hypothesis for the USD/COP 
exchange rate, using weekly data for the period from January 1994, when Colombia 
introduced its crawling band exchange rate regime, to August 2002. The study yields 
several interesting results. For the period October 1996 to August 2002 the UIP 
hypothesis receives relatively strong support, even if this is weakened towards the 
end of the period. This is in stark contrast with the almost unanimous rejection of UIP 
shown by the literature. UIP is, furthermore, tested for a duration of time of 3, 6 and 
12 months, and in line with other studies, the validity of the UIP relationship 
increases with the term of the investment. However, we suspect that the strong 
support for UIP might be a temporary occurrence due to the fact that Colombia 
during this period went through a considerable macroeconomic transition, where a 
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1 Introduction 
 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a classical theory in international economics, and it 
is a fundamental building block in most monetary models. However, empirically it 
has proven to be a miserable failure. According to UIP, the interest differential 
between two countries should on average equal the expected change in the exchange 
rate. Under rational expectations, the actual ex-post change in the exchange rate 
should be a good proxy for the expected change. Economies with high interest rates 
should, consequently, have depreciating currencies. Empirical studies have, however, 
shown that in the majority of such cases the currencies have appreciated, particularly 
in the short to medium term. A strong consensus has, therefore, developed in the 
literature that UIP works poorly. 
 
In this paper, UIP is tested for the rate of exchange of the Colombian peso (COP) to 
the US dollar (USD) during recent years. Weekly data is used for the period January 
1994 to August 2002. Relatively strong support for UIP is found from October 1996 
and onwards, even if this seems to weaken towards the end of the period. These 
findings are in stark contradiction with the failure of UIP in other studies, and in that 
sense the results are somewhat surprising. The strong support for UIP might, 
however, be temporary and might have been caused by the fact that Colombia during 
this period went through a considerable macroeconomic transition where the inflation 
rate was brought down from double-digit to single-digit levels. 
 
In section 2, the theoretical framework is laid out, and the empirical literature on UIP 
is briefly surveyed. Section 3 concisely describes the recent exchange rate regimes 
that have been in place in Colombia, and in section 4 the data is analysed and the 
results presented. The paper ends with a brief summary in section 5. 
  4 




UIP is a fundamental theory in exchange rate economics. However, the literature has 
developed a strong consensus, that UIP performs poorly in empirical studies. In the 
first section of this chapter the UIP hypothesis is derived. Thereafter the empirical 
literature on UIP is briefly surveyed. The chapter ends with a section discussing why 
exchange rates behave differently in the short and long term, and why UIP might 
perform better in the longer term. 
 
 
2.1   The Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of UIP states that market forces equilibrate the expected return on an 
uncovered investment in a foreign currency to the return on the riskless option of 
investing in local currency.
1 If Et is the expectations operator and EtSt + T denotes the 
expected value at time t of the spot exchange rate S at time t + T, the UIP hypothesis 
can be expressed as 
 
  EtSt + T (1 + rt
*) = St (1 + rt)       (2.1) 
 
where St is the exchange rate at time t, and rt and rt
* are domestic and foreign interest 
rates at time t. The exchange rate S is measured in units of domestic currency per unit 
of foreign currency. 
 
Rewriting equation (2.1) yields 
 ( EtSt + T - St) / St = (rt - rt
*) / (1 + rt
*)      (2.2) 
                                                 
1 This hypothesis emerges as a special case from the conceptual framework generally referred to as the 
international asset pricing model. See Hodrick (1987) or Meese (1989) for a general discussion as well 
as for references to the literature.  5 
 
If s is the logarithmic value of S, this would with approximations imply that
2 
 
  Etst + T - st ≈ rt - rt
*        ( 2 . 3 )  
 
Note that UIP can be written for any duration of time T. Consequently, if UIP is valid, 
the whole expected future time path of the spot exchange rate can be derived from the 
yield curves of the domestic and foreign interest rates. 
 
The UIP hypothesis in itself as expressed by equation (2.3) is, however, not very 
interesting. The absence of reliable data for the expected future exchange rate makes 
it difficult to reach definitive conclusions about its validity. 
 
Testing UIP normally involves combining it with the assumption that investors have 
rational expectations and that the expected future spot rate, even if not observable in 
itself, can be regarded as an unbiased predictor of the actual future spot rate. It is, 
therefore, assumed that on average 
 
  Etst + T = st + T           ( 2 . 4 )  
 
and equation (2.3) can be rewritten as 
 
  st + T - st ≈ rt - rt
*        ( 2 . 5 )  
 
                                                 
2 Note that for 1 + rt
* and 1 + rt close to 1, 
 
  EtSt + T / St = 1 +  (rt - rt
*) / (1 + rt





  Etst + T - st ≈ rt - rt
* 
  6 
We have so far assumed that the foreign and domestic investments are of equal risk, 
or, alternatively, that investors are risk neutral. However, if investors are risk averse 
and if the domestic investment carries a larger default risk, equation (2.5) can be 
rewritten as 
 
  st + T - st ≈ rt - rt
* - φt        ( 2 . 6 )  
 
where φt represents the risk premium of the domestic interest rate associated with the 
difference in default risk between the domestic and foreign investments. In practice 
this should equal the interest rate spread between domestic and foreign investments 
when both are denominated in the same currency. 
 
The relationships stated by equation (2.5) and (2.6) are tested by estimating
3 
 
 ( st + T - st) = a + b (rt - rt




 ( st + T - st) = a + b (rt - rt
*) - c φt + εt      ( 2 . 8 )  
 
 
where a, b and c are regression coefficients and εt is the forecasting error realised at 
time t + T from a forecast of the exchange rate made at time t. For UIP to be valid, a 
should approximately equal zero, b should approximately equal one, and c should 
approximately equal minus one. The condition that the parameter estimate of b should 
be approximately equal to unity, is generally referred to as the unbiasedness 
hypothesis.
4 If equation (2.7) is estimated for investments of different risk (under the 
assumption of risk averse investors), the parameter estimate of a should, furthermore, 
                                                 
3 See Meese (1989) for a discussion on these specification forms. 
4 Meredith and Chinn (1998), p. 4.  7 
reflect the difference in risk, and should, therefore, not equal zero. In the case where 
the domestic investments are more risky than the foreign investments, the former 
should yield an interest premium over the latter, even if the exchange rate is expected 




2.2   Review of Empirical Studies 
 
Even if UIP in its simplicity is a very attractive theoretical hypothesis, empirical tests 
have almost universally failed it. The standard practice is to estimate equation (2.7) 
using ordinary least squares or generalised least squares, and then to investigate how 
close the parameter estimates are to their expected values.
5 As discussed in the 
previous section, the slope parameter b should approximately be equal to unity. If 
interest rate data are coming from investments of similar risk, which have been the 
case in many studies, the constant a should, furthermore, not be significantly different 
from zero.  
 
An extensive literature has by now rejected the UIP hypothesis empirically.
6 In Froot 
(1990), 75 published studies are surveyed. The large majority of these reject the 
unbiasedness hypothesis that the slope parameter b in equation (2.7) should equal 
unity. Not only are the parameter estimates of b in these studies significantly less than 
one, but in most of the studies they are negative. None of the studies yields a 
parameter estimate exceeding unity. The average estimate of b in fact equals minus 
0.88. Similar results have been reported by other surveys, including MacDonald and 
Taylor (1992), Isard (1995), and Lewis (1995). 
 
                                                 
5 Some later papers have used other techniques, such as, for example cointegration frameworks, but the 
results are similar.  See, for example, Wu (1999). 
6 Initial studies include Bilson (1981), Longworth (1981), as well as the seminal paper by Meese and 
Rogoff (1983).  8 
However, the common perception that the failure of UIP indicates that short-term 
exchange rate movements are best characterised as a random walk might not be true. 




A number of studies have, nevertheless, concluded that even if UIP fails in the short 
term, its validity increases with the term of the investment.
8 Meredith and Chinn 
(1998) tests the UIP hypothesis using 10-year government bond yields of the G-7 
countries. Their results differs starkly from the short-term studies. For all the 
currencies, the estimated slope coefficients are positive, with four of the six values 
lying closer to unity than to zero, and in all of the cases except for one, the hypothesis 
that b equals zero can be rejected. 
 
 
2.3   Exchange Rate Determination in the Short and Long Term 
 
We concluded in the earlier section that even if there is little empirical support for 
UIP in the short term, long-term studies have yielded much more favourable results. 
Two possible explanations are here suggested. 
 
First, in the short term there might exist a second relationship between the interest 
rates and exchange rate, in addition to that stipulated by UIP, as emphasised by 
McCallum (1994). Monetary authorities in many countries use short-term interest 
rates as a monetary policy instrument. These are adjusted in response to undesired 
exchange rate movements. A negative exogenous shock to the economy leads to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. To counter this, short-term interest rates are raised. 
When the shock fades away, the exchange rate appreciates, and short-term interest 
                                                 
7 Meredith and Chinn (1998). 
8 See, for example, Berk and Knot (2001), McCallum (1994), and Meredith and Chinn (1998).  9 
rates are lowered.
9 In this case, high interest rates are, in fact, followed by an 
exchange rate appreciation, which is in line with empirical findings, but which is in 
direct conflict with what is stated by the UIP hypothesis. 
 
Second, a number of studies have shown that, due to incomplete information in the 
short term, the behaviour of market participants is to a large extent based on technical 
analysis  of short-term trends or other patterns in the observed behaviour of the 
exchange rate.
10 In support of such behaviour, simulations have shown short-term 
trading strategies based on technical analysis to generate significant profits.
11 The 
long-term behaviour of exchange rates are, on the other hand, much more governed 
by fundamentals. 
 
Models have been developed where feedback traders coexist with fundamentalists as 
market participants.
12 The former, which are also sometimes referred to as chartists, 
base their trading strategies on the recent history of exchange rates, while the latter 
base their strategies on analysis of economic fundamentals. In these types of models, 
the fundamentalists have the predominant influence of exchange rates in the long 
term. However, risk aversion together with substantial uncertainties regarding news 
and new information, leads to feedback traders dominating the market in the short 
term. This implies that short-term exchange rates will vary much more widely than is 
justified by changes in fundamentals. Feedback trading can be regarded as rational in 
the context of incomplete information and a continuous learning process. Information 




                                                 
9 Even if central banks are not intervening to defend the exchange rate, they often tend to hold short-
term interest rates relatively constant. This implies that short-term interest differentials will vary much 
less than other variables influencing the risk of the country, which might be a potential explanation of 
the negative parameter estimates of b. See Isard (1988) as well as Boyer and Adams (1988). 
10 See, for example, Taylor and Allen (1992). 
11 See Cumby and Modest (1987), Dooley and Shafer (1983), and Sweeny (1986). 
12 See, for example, Kyle (1985), Frankel and Froot (1990), and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990).  10 
According to the theories presented here, short-term exchange rate behaviour will, 
consequently, be dominated by the behaviour of feedback traders, by short-term 
economic shocks, and by the response of monetary policy to such shocks, while long-
term exchange rate to a large extent are governed by economic fundamentals. 




                                                                                                                                          
13 See, for example, Lyons (1993).  11 
3 The USD/COP Exchange Rate 
 
 
In this study we are using data from January 1994 until present. The USD/COP 
exchange rate was characterised by a crawling band regime from January 1994 until 
September 1999, after which it has been floating freely. The first section of this 
chapter discusses the different exchange rate regimes and what impact they have had 
on the exchange rate. The second section looks at the change in the exchange rate 
together with the interest rate differentials between the United States and Colombia. 
 
 
3.1   The Different Exchange Rate Regimes in Colombia 
 
From 1967 and up until 1991, the exchange rate regime in Colombia was defined by a 
crawling peg. The Colombian peso was pegged to the US dollar at a pre-specified 
exchange rate and was not allowed to depart significantly from this rate. This   
exchange rate was, furthermore, devalued daily at a pre-determined and continuous 
devaluation rate. The exchange rate regime was combined with a system of thorough 
capital controls, where all foreign exchange transactions had to be made through the 
Banco de la República. This period had earned Colombia a reputation for outstanding 
macroeconomic stability. The rate of inflation was high but stable at between 20 and 
30 per cent per year, and a recession had not been experienced since 1931. However, 
things were to change dramatically during the second part of the 1990s.
14 
 
The crawling peg regime was abolished in June 1991. In 1989 the rate of daily 
devaluations had been increased to counter a sharp fall in international coffee prices 
and a deterioration in the trade balance. The latter was due to the opening up of the 
economy. However, inflation was running at a high rate, which required more 
restrictive monetary policies, and in June 1991, the decision was taken to introduce a 
                                                 
14 For a thorough discussion on the Colombian exchange rate regimes, see Villar and Rincón (2000), as 
well as Cárdenas (1997). The discussion here draws heavily from Villar and Rincón (2000).  12 
more flexible exchange rate regime. A market for foreign exchange was created, 
where the exchange rate was freely determined.
15 However, the Banco de la 
República continued to maintain an official exchange rate set as a crawling peg, and 
this came to act as a ceiling of the market exchange rate. In practice the new 
exchange rate regime was a managed floating regime with many similarities to a 
crawling exchange rate band. 
 
In January 1994, the central bank introduced an official crawling band regime. This 
was to regain control over monetary variables, after a period of very low real interest 
rates in combination with very large capital inflows. The exchange rate was allowed 
to fluctuate around a pre-determined central rate, which initially was to be 
continuously devalued at an annual rate of 11 per cent. The actual exchange rate 
could depart with as much as 7 per cent from the central rate. As shown by figure 3.1, 
the regime, in fact, very much resembled a managed float, since the limits of the band 
were shifted several times, and since the band was relatively wide. “In this sense, the 
currency band was not supposed to create obstacles in the process of adjustment of 
the exchange rate but to guarantee a more orderly and gradual adjustment when such 





                                                 
15 The market traded Exchange Rate Certificates (Certificados de Cambio) which were US dollar 
denominated interest bearing papers issued by the Banco de la República. See Villar and Rincón 
(2000), pp 27ff. 
16 Villar and Rincón (2000), p. 30.  13 




Figure 3.1. The Colombian exchange rate band 1994 – 1999 
 















The USD/COP exchange rate 14 
In September 1998 the exchange rate band was shifted, following speculative 
pressure for a devaluation. The economy experienced difficulties, and the GDP 
growth rate in 1998 was a mere 1 per cent. In 1999 the economic crisis worsened 
significantly. In June the band was shifted for the second time in less then a year and 
a new macroeconomic programme was announced. Colombia was, however, running 
a large fiscal deficit, and the credibility of the currency band system was rapidly 
deteriorating. In September 1999 the Government reached an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund on a 3-year macroeconomic adjustment programme. As 
part of this agreement, the exchange rate band was dismantled, and the exchange rate 
was allowed to float freely. 
 
The floating regime is close to a free float. The Banco de la República has two 
mechanisms with which it can intervene in the markets.
17 First, the central bank 
auctions a limited amount of foreign exchange put options every month. This is used 
for accumulation of international reserves. Second, the bank can intervene in the 
market to reduce extreme short-term exchange rate volatility. This is done through the 
auctioning of put or call options on foreign exchange, but is only used if the average 
exchange rate of a given day deviates more than 4 per cent from its 20-day moving 
average. The second type of intervention has, in fact, not been used until earlier this 
year. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the exchange rate development since 1994, and Figure 3.3 shows 
the exchange rate variability. It is apparent from Figure 3.2 that the exchange rate has 
left its path of a long-term stable depreciation rate. Nevertheless, the rate of domestic 
consumer price inflation has fallen significantly from an average of 16.6 per cent 
from 1994 to 1998 to a rate of 9.4 per cent in 2001. The short-term variability of the 
exchange rate, as shown by Figure 3.3, has, on the other hand, not changed 
significantly. If we calculate the average absolute weekly change for the periods 
January 1994 to September 1999 and October 1999 to August 2002 we receive values  15 
of 0.72 per cent and 0.68 per cent respectively. Short-term variability has, thus, not 
been influenced by the change in exchange rate regime. 
                                                                                                                                          



















Figure 3.2. The USD/COP exchange rate under the different regimes 
 





















Figure 3.3. Short-term variability of the USD/COP exchange rate, expressed as 
percentage change from previous week 
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3.2   The Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate Differentials 
 
The UIP hypothesis is tested through estimation of equation (2.7), as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This states that the change in the exchange rate, st + T - st, should 
equal the interest rate differential, rt - rt
*. Figure 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 graph the changes in 




From these graphs we make the following observations: First, the 12-month time 
series seem to follow each other closely after October 1996, as shown by Figure 3.6. 
However, for the 3-month duration, the time series seem relatively independent of 
each other, as indicated by Figure 3.4. Second, all the time series look non-stationary, 
apart from the 3-month change in the exchange rate. Non-stationarity is a condition 
for cointegration, and we might, therefore, suspect that a valid cointegrating 
relationship does not exist in the 3-month case. This will be tested in the next chapter. 
 
The pattern in Figure 3.6 is very interesting. It seems that the UIP relationship might 
hold from October 1996 onwards. However, during this time Colombia went through 
a considerable macroeconomic transition. Inflation was brought down from double-
digit rates to single-digit rates, and the growth rate of the money supply fell 
significantly. The GDP growth rate slowed, and in 1999 the country experienced its 
first recession since the 1930s.
19 These variables all have an influence upon the 
interest rate and the exchange rate.
20 It is quite probable that the macroeconomic 
transition caused the clear shift in the rate of exchange rate depreciation as well as in 
the interest rate differentials, illustrated in Figure 3.6.  
                                                 
18 The data used is discussed in the following chapter. 
19 A recession is defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth. 
20 See, for example, seminal papers by Dornbusch (1976), and Hooper and Morton (1982), or the 


















Figure 3.4. The 3-month change in the USD/COP exchange rate together with the 
differential between US and Colombian 3-month interest rates 
 
Note: Interest differentials are expressed as the difference between the 3-month return on the 


















Figure 3.5. The 6-month change in the USD/COP exchange rate together with the 6-
month differential between US and Colombian 6-month interest rates 
 
Note: Interest differentials are expressed as the difference between the 6-month return on the 
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Figure 3.6. The 12-month change in the USD/COP exchange rate together with the 
12-month differential between US and Colombian 12-month interest rates 
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4 Empirical Analysis 
 
 
This chapter tests the UIP hypothesis for the USD/COP exchange rate. In the first 
section of the chapter the time-series data used is defined and discussed. In the second 
section the regression analysis is performed and the results are analysed. Some 
conclusions of the research are drawn in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.1   The Data Set 
 
To test the UIP hypothesis for the USD/COP exchange rate we use weekly data from 
January 1994, when the crawling-band regime was introduced, up until August 
2002.
21 As discussed in the previous chapter, Colombia had two different exchange 
rate regimes during this period. Between January 1994 and September 1999, 
exchange rate movements were restricted by a crawling band. In September 1999, the 
crawling band was dismantled and the exchange rate was allowed to float freely, 
which has been the prevalent exchange rate regime since then. 
 
The UIP hypothesis is tested using 3, 6 and 12-month interest rates. For the United 
States we are using interest rates of US Treasuries with constant maturities. For 
Colombia we are using certificates of deposits of the banking system to define 
interest rates. Interest rates used are those for the DTF, CDT 180 and CDT 360, 
which are 90-day, 180-day and 360-day certificates of deposits respectively. The 
source of the US data is the Federal Reserve, and that of the Colombian data is Banco 
de la República. 
 
                                                 
21 The source used is Banco de la República.  21 
As Figure 4.1 shows, the difference between the 3, 6 and 12-month Colombian 
interest rates are relatively small, while the difference between Colombian and US 


















Figure 4.1. Interest rates in Colombia and in the United States 
 
Note: The Colombian interest rates have followed each other closely. The yield curve has generally 
been normal, implying that the 12-month rate in the graph is the highest and the 3-month rate the 
lowest. During the interest rate peaks, the yield curve was, however, inverted. 
 
Source: Banco de la República, and the Federal Reserve. 
 
Table 4.1. Ratings of Colombian banks as well as of Colombian and US sovereigns 
 
Entity Rated  Moody’s Rating 
(long-term deposits or 
government bonds) 
Banks (Colombia)   
BBV Banco Ganadero S.A.  Ba3 
Bancafe S.A.  Ba3 
Banco Popular S.a.  Ba3 
Banco de Bogota  Ba3 
Bancolombia S.A.  Ba3 
  
Sovereigns   
Colombia (domestic/foreign currency)  Baa2/Ba2 
United States  Aaa 
  
 
Note: The terminology of Moody’s differs from that of the other main rating agencies. The Ba3 rating 
corresponds to the BB-, Baa2 to BBB, Ba2 to BB and Aaa to AAA. 
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Colombian CDs (3, 6 and 12 months) US 3-month Treasuries Interest rates (%) 23 
The UIP hypothesis normally assumes investments to be riskless. However, in 
Colombia, investments carry significant risk, and the choice of interest rates, 
therefore, needs some attention. The main Colombian banks are rated BB- (or Ba3 
using the Moody’s terminology), as shown in Table 4.1, and we will therefore assume 
that certificates of deposits of the Colombian banking system will carry a similar risk. 
This is far below the AAA rating of US sovereign debt, and also far below the AA 
rating of US bank debt.
22 However, the ratings of Colombian banks are not too far 
away from the BBB rating of Colombian sovereign debt denominated in the domestic 
currency.
23 We will, therefore, accept it as a good proxy for Colombian interest rates. 
 
The interest differential between Colombian and US interest rates, will partly be 
related to the expected change in the exchange rate, according to the UIP hypothesis, 
and partly to the different risks of default of the different investments. To capture this 
risk, we will use data on the spread between the 10-year US dollar denominated 
Colombian global bonds and the 10-year US Treasuries.
24 As shown in Table 4.1, the 
former are BB rated, which is a rating similar to that of the Colombian banking 
system, while the latter are AAA rated. 
 
The sovereign spread is illustrated in Figure 4.2. In 1997 the spread was below 200 
basis points, and it rose only marginally during the Asian crisis in the second half of 
1997. However Colombia was, together with most Latin American countries, severely 
affected by the Russian default of August 1998, when the spread rose to well over 
1000 basis points. Since then the spread has remained volatile and at much higher 
                                                 
22 The main US banks are rated AA or AA+ according to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. It would, 
thus, make little difference if certificates of deposits of the US banking system were used instead of 
US Treasuries as a base for US interest rates. 
23 Even if the difference is four rating notches, it should not significantly influence the results of the 
study undertaken here. 
24 Ideally we should have used the spread of  investments of 3, 6 and 12-month maturity, but data on 
such spreads do not exist. The spread data used is, furthermore, a measure of the default risk of 
Colombian sovereign US dollar denominated securities, while we are using peso denominated 
certificates of deposits of the banking system as the source of domestic interest rates. We can, 
however, use the spread of the former as an indicator of the default risk of the latter, if we assume that  24 
levels than experienced in 1997. Recent fiscal problems have induced another surge 
in the spread, to levels similar to that during the Russian crisis. 
                                                                                                                                          
the default risks of these two groups of securities are highly correlated, which is not an unreasonable 



















Figure 4.2. The sovereign spread between Colombian and US government securities 
 
Source: Banco de la República. 
 
 
To estimate equation (2.7) we need to construct time series for the change in the 
exchange rate, st + T - st,
25 as well as for the interest differential, rt - rt
*. The change in 
the exchange rate is computed for the duration of time T of 3, 6 and 12 months, which 
with weekly data correspond to 13, 26 and 52 weeks respectively. The interest rate 
differentials are computed as the differences between the interest rates on Colombian 
certificates of deposits and on US Treasuries for the maturities of 3, 6 and 12 months. 
Note that the interest rate differentials should be expressed as quarterly, semi-annual 
and annual returns respectively for the 3, 6 and 12-month investments, to be 
comparable to the percentage change in the exchange rate during these periods. 
Consequently, the interest differential for the 3-month rate should be divided by four 
to be comparable with the 3-month change in the exchange rate. The interest 
differential for the 6-month rate should be divided by two. 
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10-year Colombian Global Bonds Spread over US Treasuries (basis points) 26 
4.2   Regression Analysis and Results 
 
To test the UIP hypothesis we will investigate the existence of a valid cointegrating 
vector between the changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate differentials. We 
are doing this using the Engle-Granger methodology,




We start by testing the time series for unit roots. These tests are summarised in Table 
4.1. All the time series are integrated of order one, I(1), apart from the 3-month 
change in the exchange rate, which is stationary. This is in line with our earlier 
conclusion from studying the graphs of the time series. 







3-month time series 
(st + 3 - st)  ADF(32) = -3.31  ∆ (st + 3 - st)  ADF(32) = -4.42 
(rt - rt
*)  ADF(1) = -0.75  ∆ (rt - rt
*)  ADF(1) = -10.95 
       
6-month time series 
(st + 6 - st)  ADF(30) = -2.24  ∆ (st + 6 - st)  ADF(34) = -3.35 
(rt - rt
*)  ADF(8) = -0.80  ∆ (rt - rt
*)  ADF(8) = -5.47 
       
12-month time series 
(st + 12 - st)  ADF(24) = -2.37  ∆ (st + 12 - st)  ADF(32) = -3.20 
(rt - rt
*)  ADF(2) = -0.54  ∆ (rt - rt
*)  ADF(2) = -13.48 
       
Spread       
φt  ADF(1) = -1.97  ∆ φt  ADF(1) = -9.62 
       
 
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to test for unit roots. The value in parentheses is the 
order of the lag used. The null hypothesis in each case is that the variable is integrated of order one 
and, thereby, non-stationary. The 5 per cent rejection region for non-stationarity for the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller statistic is ADF < -2.89, according to Fuller (1976).  
                                                 
26 See Engle and Granger (1987), or for an overview, Enders (1995). 
27 We are here not interested in the short-term dynamics, and, therefore, we do not need to estimate the 
error-correction model.  27 
To investigate the existence of a cointegrating vector, we estimate equation (2.7) as 
well as equation (2.8) using OLS methodology. These equations are restated here, for 
simplicity. 
 
 ( st + T - st) = a + b (rt - rt
*) + εt       ( 4 . 1 )  
 
 ( st + T - st) = a + b (rt - rt
*) - c φt + εt      ( 4 . 2 )  
 
For UIP to be valid, a should approximately equal zero, b should approximately equal 
one, and c should approximately equal minus one. Nevertheless, equation (4.1) 
normally assumes that the domestic and foreign investments are of similar risk. This 
is, however, not the case for Colombian and US investments, where the former 
carries a significantly higher default risk than the latter. In this case, the parameter 
estimate of a should be negative when equation (4.1) is estimated, as discussed in 
section 2.1. 
 
If we estimate equation (4.1) for the 3, 6 and 12-month time series, we receive the 
results presented in Table 4.2. 
 
For the 3-month case, the parameter estimate of a is positive and significantly 
different from zero, while the parameter estimate of b is of the wrong sign and not 
significantly different from zero. However, even if this contradicts the UIP 
hypothesis, it is in line with other empirical tests, that usually get a negative 
parameter estimate for b for shorter time durations. More serious is that the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic indicates that the error terms are non-stationary,
28 
and we can, therefore, accept the null-hypothesis that a valid cointegrating vector 
does not exist. This result is hardly surprising, since the changes in the exchange rate 
are stationary, while the interest differentials are I(1), as shown earlier in Table 4.1. 
 
                                                 
28 This also implies that the parameter estimates of the OLS regression are not valid.  28 
For the 6 and 12-month case, the parameter estimate of a is again positive and 
significantly different from zero. However, now the parameter estimate of b is of the 
right sign, even if it is not significantly different from zero in the 6-month case. In 
both cases the existence of a valid cointegrating vector can be rejected, since the error 
terms are non-stationary, as shown by the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics. 29 
Table 4.2. Regressions for the time period January 1994 to August 2002 
 
 
3-month time series 
 
 ( st + 3 - st) = 0.036 – 0.049 (rt - rt
*)  
          (6.38)   (-0.45) 
 
 R
2 = 0.00; Adjusted R
2 = 0.00; ADF(26) = -2.66 
 
6-month time series 
 
 ( st + 6 - st) = 0.051 + 0.141 (rt - rt
*) 
          (6.24)   (1.84) 
 
 R
2 = 0.01; Adjusted R
2 = 0.01; ADF(36) = -3.05 
 
12-month time series 
 
 ( st + 12 - st) = 0.074 + 0.300 (rt - rt
*) 
           (6.29)    (5.53) 
 
 R
2 = 0.01; Adjusted R
2 = 0.01; ADF(18) = -2.86 
 
 
Note 1: Interest differentials are expressed as the difference between the return on the domestic and the 
foreign investments in absolute value, and not as an annualised return (apart from the 12-month case, 
when these are the same). 
 
Note 2: The t-ratios are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates. The Augmented Dickey-
Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis that the residuals are integrated of order one and, thereby, non-
stationary. The 5 per cent rejection region for non-stationarity for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
statistic within the Engle-Granger framework is ADF < -3.17. See Enders (1995), p. 383. The value in 
parentheses shows the order of the lag used for the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
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In the previous chapter, we concluded that even if a cointegrating relationship does 
not exist for the whole period, it seems to exist after October 1996, as indicated by 
Figure 3.5. We, therefore, rerun the regressions using data for the period October 
1996 to August 2002. The results are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Regressions for the time period October 1996 to August 2002 
 
 
3-month time series 
 
 ( st + 3 - st) = 0.029 + 0.319 (rt - rt
*) 
          (4.52)   (2.21) 
 
 R
2 = 0.02; Adjusted R
2 = 0.02; ADF(17) = -4.47 
 
6-month time series 
 
 ( st + 6 - st) = 0.031 + 0.583 (rt - rt
*) 
          (3.62)   (6.17) 
 
 R
2 = 0.12; Adjusted R
2 = 0.12; ADF(18) = -5.34 
 
12-month time series 
 
 ( st + 12 - st) = 0.021 + 0.801 (rt - rt
*) 
          (2.45)    (16.96) 
 
 R
2 = 0.53; Adjusted R





These results look very interesting. First, the error terms in all three cases are 
stationary, indicating the existence of a valid cointegrating relationship. The 
parameter estimates of b are of the right sign and significantly different from zero in  31 




In all three cases the parameter estimate of a is positive and significantly different 
from zero. This might at first be rather puzzling, since a according to theory should 
be negative. Colombian investments carry a significant default risk relative to US 
investments and should, therefore, yield an interest rate premium even if the currency 
is not expected to depreciate, and, hence, a should be negative. However, the 
parameter estimate of b is not equal to one, and the depreciation of the exchange rate 
has, therefore, according to these estimations, not been fully explained by the interest 
differential. If b in the 12-month case is restricted to one, the parameter estimate of a 
will be minus 0.012, which indeed is negative. It is also significantly different from 
zero, with a t-statistic of minus 3.41. In the 6-month and 3-month case the parameter 
estimate of a would be minus 0.002 and 0.002 respectively. In none of these cases the 
parameter estimate is significantly different from zero. T-statistics are minus 0.56 and 
0.55 respectively. 
 
We can, therefore, conclude that the results, particularly for the 12-month case, are 
supportive of the existence of a UIP relationship. For the 12-month case, the 
explanatory value (the adjusted R squared) is 0.53, which, furthermore, is very good. 
 
However, we should at this point emphasise that, even if the frequency of the data 
used is relatively high (weekly data), the time period from October 1996 to August 
2002 is actually too short to draw any definite conclusion of a stable long-run 
relationship.
30 The shortness of the time series used is, consequently, a weakness in 
our results. 
                                                 
29 It is, however, not possible to determine whether the parameter estimates are significantly different 
from one in the OLS framework used. According to the t-tests the parameter estimates are significantly 
different from one. But since the variables used are non-stationary and the error terms, therefore, 
autocorrelated, the confidence intervals yielded by the t-test are normally underestimated. See 
Johnston (1991) pp. 310ff. Therefore we cannot draw any definite conclusion. 
30 See Juselius (1994) for a discussion on this subject.  32 
 
We continue to test the UIP hypothesis, now including the spread, and using equation 
(4.2). We only have data for the spread from February 1997 and onwards and 
consequently estimate the equation for the period February 1997 to August 2002. The 
results are presented in Table 4.4.  33 




3-month time series 
 
 ( st + 3 - st) = 0.062 + 0.177 (rt - rt
*) – 2.092 φt 
          (5.73)    (1.16)               (-3.79) 
 
 R
2 = 0.02; Adjusted R
2 = 0.01; ADF(17) = -4.77 
 
6-month time series 
 
 ( st + 6 - st) = 0.101 + 0.477 (rt - rt
*) – 2.176 φt 
          (7.45)    (4.98)               (-6.64) 
 
 R
2 = 0.26; Adjusted R
2 = 0.25; ADF(18) = -4.41 
 
12-month time series 
 
 ( st + 12 - st) = 0.079 + 0.696 (rt - rt
*) – 0.772 φt 
          (5.65)    (13.95)              (-5.00) 
 
 R
2 = 0.55; Adjusted R
2 = 0.55; ADF(8) = -3.81 
 
 
Note: Both interest differentials and spreads are expressed as the difference between the return on the 
domestic and foreign investments in absolute value, and not as an annualised return (apart from the 12-
month case, when these are the same). 
 
 
Also these results look very good. In all the regressions the parameter estimate of c is 
of the right sign and significantly different from zero, and in the 12-month case it is 
not significantly different from minus one. The error terms are all stationary, 
indicating the existence of a cointegrating relationship. The parameter estimates of b 
are all significant and of the right sign. They are however further away from unity 
then in the previous regression. The parameter estimate of a are also in all the cases 
higher than in the previous regression.  34 
Colombia abandoned the crawling band in September 1999 in favour of a freely 
floating exchange rate. Studying Figure 4.5 leads us to conclude that this might have 
changed the relationship between the changes in the exchange rate and the interest 
rate differentials. If we rerun the regressions with and without the sovereign spread 




Table 4.5. Regressions for the time period October 1999 to August 2002 
 
 
3-month time series 
 
 ( st + 3 - st) = 0.099 – 3.605 (rt - rt
*) 
          (7.49)   (-5.81) 
 
 R
2 = 0.20; Adjusted R
2 = 0.19; ADF(13) = -0.90 
 
6-month time series 
 
 ( st + 6 - st) = 0.092 – 1.104 (rt - rt
*) 
          (5.06)   (-2.75) 
 
 R
2 = 0.06; Adjusted R
2 = 0.05; ADF(4) = -1.28 
 
12-month time series 
 
 ( st + 12 - st) = 0.124 - 0.505 (rt - rt
*) 
          (5.45)    (-2.14) 
 
 R
2 = 0.04; Adjusted R
2 = 0.03; ADF(2) = -1.26 
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3-month time series 
 
 ( st + 3 - st) = 0.156 - 4.446 (rt - rt
*) – 2.504 φt 
          (5.77)  (-6.32)               (-2.40) 
 
 R
2 = 0.23; Adjusted R
2 = 0.22; ADF(5) = -2.05 
 
6-month time series 
 
 ( st + 6 - st) = 0.166 – 1.612 (rt - rt
*) – 1.576 φt 
          (4.24)   (-3.48)               (-2.11) 
 
 R
2 = 0.09; Adjusted R
2 = 0.08; ADF(1) = -0.81 
 
12-month time series 
 
 ( st + 12 - st) = 0.283 - 0.890 (rt - rt
*) – 1.791 φt 
          (6.11)   (-3.66)              (-3.86) 
 
 R
2 = 0.17; Adjusted R





The error terms in all these regressions are non-stationary, which indicates that the 
cointegrating relationships that existed earlier might have been broken. However, the 
regression period is too short for this latest test to provide for any definite conclusion. 
It is also apparent that the parameter estimates of b are significantly different from 
zero, but of the wrong sign. We, consequently, conclude that the UIP relationship 
seems to have been significantly weakened, if not broken totally, after the 
introduction of the floating exchange rate. Due to the shortness of the time period, 
these results might, however, not be stable, and will need to be confirmed by a future 
study when longer time series exist. 




This paper has tested the UIP hypothesis with the USD/COP exchange rate, using 
weekly data for the period from January 1994, when the crawling-band regime was 
introduced, up until August 2002. We have used ordinary least squares to test 
equation (2.7) and (2.8) for Engle-Granger cointegration, which is in line with many 
earlier studies. 
 
The study has yielded several important results. The UIP hypothesis seem to hold for 
the period October 1996 to August 2002, even if the shortness of the time series used 
might put the stability of the results into question. The UIP relationship, furthermore, 
seem to have been significantly weakened towards the end of the period, if not broken 
completely. The results are summarised in Table 5.1. We have shown earlier, that for 
all the regressions presented in Table 5.1, the error terms are stationary, and a valid 
cointegration relationship, consequently, exist. Estimates of the slope parameter b are 
all of the right sign, even if not significantly different from zero in the 3-month case 
with spread (the 3-month case without spread is, furthermore, a border case). For the 
12-month cases, as well as for the 6-month case without spread, the slope parameter 
is closer to unity than to zero. Estimates of the spread parameter c are all significant 
and of the right sign. 
 
These test results are among the most favourable of any study of the UIP hypothesis, 
which might be somewhat surprising. They differ starkly from the almost unanimous 
rejection of the hypothesis shown by earlier papers. 
 
It is, furthermore, apparent from the results in Table 5.1, that the validity of the UIP 
relationship increases with the term of the investment, which is in line with earlier 
studies. While the results for the 3-month duration are relatively weak, the UIP 
hypothesis receive significant support from the 12-month results.   37 




Estimate of a 
value          t-stat 
Estimate of b 
value          t-stat 
Estimate of c 
value          t-stat 
Without spread – equation (2.7) 
3  months  0.029 (4.52) 0.319 (2.21) N/A 
6  months  0.031 (6.32) 0.583 (6.17) N/A 
12  months  0.021 (2.45) 0.801 (16.96)  N/A 
        
With spread – equation (2.8) 
3  months  0.062 (5.73) 0.117 (1.16) -2.092  (-3.79) 
6  months  0.101 (7.45) 0.477 (4.98) -2.176  (-6.64) 
12  months  0.079 (5.65) 0.696 (13.95)  -0.772  (-5.00) 
        
 
Note 1: The lower half of the table (estimation of equation (2.8)) uses data from the period February 
1997 to August 2002, since spread data was not available for earlier dates. 
 
Note 2: In all the cases the error terms have been shown to be stationary, and a valid cointegrating 
vector, therefore, exists. 
 
 
Colombia introduced its crawling-band exchange-rate regime in January 1994. 
However, this study indicates that a valid UIP relationship did not exist until mid-
1996. This relationship seem to have been considerably weakened towards the end of 
the period, and we might suspect that this had to do with the change of exchange rate 
regime in 1999, when the exchange rate band was abolished in favour of a free float. 
This would be in line with research presented by Lewis (1988, 1989), who argue that 
market participants do not have complete information and are engaging in a process 
of rational learning. When an exchange rate regime has been changed, it will take 
some time for market participants to learn to correctly form their expectations of 
future exchange rates under the new regime. If this is the case, the validity of the UIP 
relationship should again increase when the floating rate regime has been in place for 
some time. 
 
There is, however, also a possibility that the significant UIP relationship found from 
October 1996 onwards could turn out to be a temporary one-off occurrence in  38 
Colombian exchange rate history. As discussed earlier, Colombia underwent a 
considerable macroeconomic transition at this time, which should have had a 
significant impact on both the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate and on the 
interest rate differentials. This transition might, indeed, have been the main reason 
why the UIP relationship holds during this period. 
 
Some recent studies have, nevertheless, indicated that UIP might actually work better 
in emerging economies than in developed economies, on which it has normally been 
tested. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) concludes that the negative correlation between 
the expected currency depreciation and interest rate differentials is mainly confined to 
developed economies. Flood and Rose (2001) finds that UIP works better for 
countries in crisis, but does, however, not find any difference between rich and poor 
countries in general. 
 
Whether the strong support for UIP in Colombia since October 1996 is a temporary 
occurrence or whether the UIP relationship will actually hold also in the future can 
only be determined by future studies. 
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